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BOOK REVIEW
THE FUTURE OF THE NET-COMMENTS ON
LAWRENCE LESSIG'S CODEAND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE AND THE FUTURE OF IDEAS"

Reed Hundtt
In his perceptive and pessimistic The Future of Ideas,
Stanford Law Professor Larry Lessig claims that the Internet
can inaugurate a golden age of creativity in arts, business
models and ideas of all kinds. In this book, Lessig builds upon
ideas developed in his first great book, Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace.1 In Code, Lessig asserts the power of software
architecture, or code, to shape the economy and society. Lessig
captured this movement in his epiphanic phrase, "Code is law."'
Both books are shrouded in balefulness. In Lessig's view,
software architects, or code writers, will erase "important
aspects of privacy and free speech,"' and "the innovation
commons [of the Internet] will... be[U carved up and sold."
Larry Lessig and his admirers should not despond, at
least not for the reasons he articulates. In the 1990s
government managed to encourage the marvelous potential of
the Internet to stimulate economic growth, improve education,
better health care and a revivify democracy-not only in the
United States, but around the globe. We need only learn (or
admit) how the legal culture successfully shaped the Net's
©2002 Reed Hundt. All Rights Reserved.
t Former Chairman of the Federal Commmunications Commission (FCC);
lecturer at Yale Law School and Yale School of Management.
1 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)
[hereinafter CODE].
2 Id. at 6.
3 Id. at 233.
4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 267 (2001) [hereinafter
IDEAS].
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prodigious growth. The starting point is the recognition that
market structureis law.
During the Internet's salad days, early users declared
the independence of their new "commons" from the law,
regulation and even the jurisdiction of the old, geographically
definable world. If software architecture substituted for law,
perhaps the Internet could be forever "unregulated." They
either did not know, or did not care, that laws and regulations
encouraging innovators to attack entrenched incumbents had
positively shaped the Net's inception and dissemination.
Professor Lessig has never been naive. In Code and The
Future Of Ideas he views the Net in the context of law,
markets, software architecture and social norms.' But in Code,
he hopelessly concluded that "[c]ourts are disabled, legislatures
pathetic, and code untouchable." He argued that "government
might regulate code" to good ends,7 .but despaired that "our
sense of the failure of government," would deprive us of the
will to do so-even at the cost of losing the Internet's freedoms.
In The Future of Ideas, Lessig urges regulations to
protect the content of the Internet from the anti-innovation
precepts of copyright and patent. He proposes that the
government interfere with code writing by firms with market
power. Regulations that ensure open source, shared software
and content will nurture what Lessig considers the Net's
essential character: Freedom. Yet, irony confounds him: "We
win the political struggle against state control so as to reentrench control in the name of the market."' The "tools" of the
First Amendment are "turned over to the arsenal of those who
would control speech."" We "move through" a halcyon period of
costless innovation to a new era of monopoly power, not over
mere products, but of ideas. The old incumbents of
communications markets are to blame: "Those threatened by
this technology of freedom have learned how to turn the
technology off."" Saddest of his sentences: "We are doing
nothing about it."'
6 CODE,
6

supra note 1, at 87.
Id. at 221.

Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
9 IDEAS, supra note 4, at 267.
"o Id. at 268.
7

8

"
12

Id.

Id.
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Code is a particularly complex and insidious product.
Monopolists-such as the Bell companies, whose networks
serve about 85% of America's on-line consumers, or Microsoft,
which controls the personal computer's operating system
gateway to the Net-may use software code and law to control
cyberspace. However, their power is at bottom no more or less
than market power. Where they have that, the essential
question is whether we use regulations to try to limit their
influence over the future of the Net or instead use regulations
to erode that market power by introducing competition.
Regulating those who hold market power is Lessig's
choice, as it was the choice of the New Deal that created the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in 1934.
Ironically, it is also the preference of the market power-holding
firms. They typically welcome some behavior regulation in
exchange for preservation of market power. They assume that
any regulatory agency eventually will fall under their political
influence.
Since the 1980s, however, eroding market power by
introducing competition has been the preference of Congress,
the various Administrations, the Federal Communications
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice. Introducing competition was the idea
behind the 1996 Telecommunications Act13 and the 1997 World
Trade Organization treaty on telecom. 4 Applied to the Net, the
competition policy helped cause this new medium to reach
more people more quickly than any communications medium in
history. In the United States, narrowband Internet access (the
type obtained over a telephone line, as opposed to broadband
over a cable modem or a DSL line) achieved 10% penetration in
just two years. It now reaches more than 50% of households,
which is comparable to cable television's penetration of about
60%." Globally, the number of Net users is already half the
number of users of telephony, which had a 125-year head start
and a third of television households, which had a fifty-year
head start.

1996 Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (1996).
14 World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecommunications Services

(Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade Services) 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
15David Simons, Internet Advertising: Think Small, Grow Big, Forbes.com,
June 13, 2002, at http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/3simons.html (last visited Aug. 29,
2002).
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Yet, a counter-revolution against the competition
paradigm is being mounted in reaction to the threats the Net
poses to existing businesses, the market downturn in the
information sector of the economy and the frustration at the
slowing pace of technological development. At this inflection
point in the Internet's history the future of the Net depends
upon the course of our legal culture. To preserve the innovative
potential of the Net, we must choose either regulation of
monopolies or regulation to create competition. We are making
a choice between an old New Deal (that Lessig says will not
work) and a Newer Deal that did work, but is now at risk. And
if we make neither choice, the pessimism of Larry Lessig will
be warranted.
Lessig, who well understands the importance of the
choice, appears to believe that a few firms are destined to
dominate most segments of the economy's information sector.
Against the face of massive market power, he urges regulations
that would assure the continued freeness and openness of the
Internet. He would have Congress and relevant administrative
agencies enact laws and regulations to guarantee users: (1) low
cost, even free, access to the Internet; (2) open source, free
software for navigating the Internet; and (3) free use of the
content of the Internet.'6 These are the three layers, or
dimensions, of the Net.
Nothing in American politics today suggests that
Lessig's program could be put in place. However, other
regulatory policies have promoted the freedom and creativity of
the Internet. The two key dimensions of the 1990s Internet
policy were creating multiple users of the existing telephone
and cable networks and building the largest possible
constituency of Net users. The purpose was to convert the Net
from an academic instrument and computer users' hobby into a
mass medium that would eventually subsume broadcast and
cable. This policy was a departure from the New Deal
approach, embodied in the 1934 Communications Act, which
formed the FCC. 7
The New Deal's legacy to the information sector was
regulation that supported, and supposedly made efficient,
monopolies or oligopolies in all market segments: telephony,
cable, wireless, satellite and broadcast. Non-competitive
16

IDEAS, supra note 4, at 85-86.

17 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
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market structures were a function of the New Deal approach of
encouraging businesses to combine into large, non-competing
entities. The purpose was to avoid repeating the alleged
mistake of the Crash of 1929-too many firms creating
overcapacity in a world of underdemand. The response of policy
was Roosevelt's creation of the alphabet agencies (FCC, SEC)
that, in conjunction with the agencies spawned in the
Progressive Era (FTC, FDA), would regulate these big
businesses toward the goals of social policy and economic
efficiency. Big government would match up against big
business to produce the right result for the society and
economy.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, academics,
drinking from the cup of economics, lost faith in the ability of
either regulatory agencies or monopolists to produce efficient or
cost-justified results. Most thinkers concluded that unregulated
competition allocated resources more efficiently than regulated
monopolies. More importantly, theorists like Harvard's Michael
Porter also concluded that competition stimulated innovation.'
In other words, unregulated and robust competition was best
for static markets, but even better for dynamic markets.
Innovation, in turn, was essential to obtain the elixir of
productivity gains from technology. And productivity is the
factor that makes an economy competitive in global markets
and richer at home. As academics changed their minds about
the New Deal approach to big business, a groundswell of
political thinking led to the introduction of competition in all
markets, even including utilities. The result in the information
sector was the Telecommunications Act of 1996,9 which
repealed
the
pro-monopoly
precepts
of the
1934
Communications Act.'
A change-of-mind within the legal culture, and the
emergence of new technologies, fueled the switch to the
competition paradigm in communications. In a speech at the
Yale School of Management in 1993, cable giant John Malone
predicted that digitization, microprocessors and optical
transmission of bits of information would transform the
communications industry. Even as he spoke, the combination of
Marc Andreessen's browser, Mosaic and Tim Berners-Lee's
1

MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING

INDUSTRIES 3-33 (1980).
19 47 U.S.C. § 251.
2D 47 U.S.C. § 151.
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World Wide Web software were producing the experience we
know now as the Internet. This network of networks, using
shared, free and open-standards software to communicate,
manifested the power of the inventions Malone identified. Now,
and with increasing speed and quality in the future, everyone,
everywhere can get everything embodied in pictures or words
or voice at almost zero incremental cost. That makes for a
revolution in distribution and communication, in business and
in society, in politics and in law.
The Internet then became the tool of attackers against
incumbents in many businesses, ranging from auctions to
watches, from art to wine. Congress and the FCC, by
coincidence of timing, opened the door to attackers in the
historically monopolized or oligopolized communications
markets at almost the same time that technology created
unprecedented disruption in those markets.
What occurred was extraordinary. The most significant
social and economic source of upheaval since the fall of the
Soviet Union turned out to be the Internet. In only ten years
more than 400 million people came to jointly use and develop
this new medium that merges text, pictures, music and (soon)
voice. This disruptive technology:
" Substituted cheap data communication for relatively
expensive voice communication, giving consumers great
benefits and potentially destroying the business models
of the global telecom industry;
" Generated electronic commerce that bypasses sales
taxes, and erodes state and local government's funding;
" Undercut numerous retail businesses by fostering new
business models (buying airline tickets at prices
suggested by buyers, for example, on Priceline.com);
" Permitted everyone on-line to download music andwhen Net transmission speed increases -movies,
thereby threatening the business models of the
entertainment sector;
* Posted more than three billion pages of text and
pictures, shaking the knowledge hegemony of the major
university centers; and
* Created more productivity gains for wired economies
than any other single technology in recent history (so
says Alan Greenspan).
This disruption attracted massive investment to
attackers and incumbents both. The stock market result was,
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as one venture capitalist said, "the greatest lawful creation of
wealth in history." 1 That was the boom.
Now we have the bust. The reactionary impulse that
Lessig bemoans is grounded in the reality of capital loss-the
reciprocal of the freeness Lessig celebrates and consumers
enjoy. In the last two years, telecommunications investors have
lost more than $2 trillion of stock market value. More than 100
start-up telephone companies have gone bankrupt in the
United States in this time period, taking down to almost zero
about $100 billion of contributed capital. In wireless,
equipment, software and chips businesses, these are the worst
of times.
The tremendous over-investment that followed the 1996
Telecommunications Act explains part of the misery. When the
law invited competition in this historically profitable sector,
investors poured billions of dollars into start-up firms. Existing
firms responded by raising billions more to rebuild their
networks. The NASDAQ soared for years. But the business
cycle was not repealed. Eerily echoing the Great Crash of 1929,
capacity was suddenly revealed to outstrip demand. A
recession hit the sector. For many, bankruptcy, not code, is now
law.
However, innovation in technology and the new Netbased business models not over-investment have had the
greatest impact on the information sector. Schumpeterian
"creative destruction" is at work.' Investors' losses and job
losses in old businesses are prices we pay for an ever-wealthier,
job-creating economy.
The American embrace of competition and technological
change has probably doomed many mainstays of the economy.
For instance, by lowering the variable cost of communication
toward zero, the Net and its associated data networking
technologies (everything John Malone talked about) threaten to
extinguish the long distance voice industry. At some point,
local voice may not be the core service of the Bells in this
country.
21 L. John Doerr, Investing in the New Nomads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1992, at
22 Joseph Schumpter described the process as "[tihe opening of new markets,
foreign or domestic, and the organization and development from the craft shop and
factory . . . illustrate the same process of industrial mutation . . . that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one,
incessantly creating a new one." JOSEPH A. SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 82-85 (1942).
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The Net challenges every incumbent firm in the
information sector. Broadcasters may be doomed. Cable can
survive in the long run only by becoming an access pipe to the
Internet. Wireless can be profitable in the fullness of time, but
only if it moves from voice to Internet communication. And
Hollywood will make no money at all if the Internet and a
laptop combine, like some grandiosely magnified Xerox
machine, to enable anyone to copy and share every song and
movie at no cost. In all these cases, the freedoms of the Net
stem from innovation and competition, not from regulatory
mandates.
Just as a baseball umpire calls either a strike or a ball,
the legal culture either encourages or discourages innovation
and competition. On some matters there is no neutral
compromise. In Japan, for example, the most salient reason for
the recession of most of the 1990s was the legal culture's
resistance to innovation in information technology, marked
most pointedly by the unwillingness to take sufficient steps to
instigate competition against the national telephone firm, NTT.
The counter-revolutionaries have a larger strategic goal
than establishing property rights over Net content. They
primarily seek to maintain market power against the
challenges of firms that attack with the new tools of Net-based
technology. Copyright and patent laws are only two of the
many weapons in their armory. However, their most powerful
weapon is the army of lobbyists, who they deploy to entrench
their market power.
Already, the Bell telephone companies have responded
to competition by persuading the House of Representatives to
repeal the core of the 1996 Telecom Act.' They do not want to
be obliged to share their networks with their start-up rivals
that have taken a one-third share of the small business
telephony market. The opposing start-ups have suffered
tremendous casualties, although they still represent a primary
means by which the Internet is introduced to small business.
But market structure is law. If Congress repeals the 1996
Telecom Act or if the FCC declines to enforce its provisions
seriously, then the incumbents will likely reemerge as the
monopoly providers to small, as well as big, business. The
community of small business customers will be shepherded into
The Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001, H.R. 1542,
108th Cong. (2001).
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the closed, pricey, non-creative Internet future that Lessig
dreads.
The judiciary has provided substantial aid and comfort
to the counter-revolutionaries. Many courts of appeals have
slowed or thwarted regulatory changes aimed at promoting
various innovative start-ups. Even now, more than six years
after the passage of the 1996 Telecom Act, the Supreme Court
is considering whether to raise the prices attackers must pay to
rent and connect to incumbent networks.' For five years, courts
stymied FCC efforts to introduce new airwaves or spectrum to
promote new wireless data innovation. The key wireless case is
on certiorari only now, after the Court denied two previous
writs.'
The entertainment capital of the world, eponymous
Hollywood, wants Congress to pass a bill requiring computer
and microprocessor companies to design their products so as to
bar the user from copying content downloaded from the
Internet for free. This would be like ordering Xerox not to make
machines that could replicate this article. The level of
government intrusion involved boggles the mind. But as Lessig
points out, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 lays
the groundwork for this measure.' It already dictates that,
apparently for a thousand years, the law should protect
software copyrights from the predations of the Internet.'
Similarly, the distribution media are moving to
eliminate the FCC's historic barriers to consolidation both
within and among the cable, broadcasting, newspaper and
radio industries. These barriers have created opportunities for
start-up media emanating from cyberspace, such as Yahoo or
AOL. Media consolidation is a way to circle the wagons around
advertising revenue and to build the capital that would permit
acquisition of plausibly successful attackers from the Net
world. Conservative columnist William Safire has called the
current FCC chairman "round heeled" and "terminally feckless"
in his failure to enforce regulations against cross-media
consolidation.' More serious in the long term, if unchecked by
24

Verizon Commmunications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S.Ct. 1646 (2002).

2Z Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d
130 (D.C. Cir.

2001), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 1202 (Mar. 4,2002) (No. 01-653).
2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. 2860, Pub. L. No. 105-304
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
27 Id.
28 William Safire, The Urge to Converge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,.2002, at A31.
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regulation, media combinations would have the power over
consumers and elected representatives to win any number of
legal and regulatory battles. In the absence of market place
competition, the new media mega-firms could have vast
capability to alter the consumer's ease of, access to,
communication through, and use of the Internet.
Lessig, however, is not so concerned with consolidation.
For him, the future of ideas is already kaput because lawyers
are extending property rights over the domain of the Net. As
examples of protected ideas he cites the images of Mickey
Mouse or a can of Coke.
It could be that if all of Hollywood's immensely
distracting output were reduced in volume by enforcing
copyright, perhaps free and important ideas, otherwise choked
by entertainment, would be more likely to thrive in the gardens
of the mind. But Lessig is right that the Internet imparts
immense energy to the world of creativity, as expressed in new
business models, new software, new hardware and even new
content. The Internet makes it much easier for content to
attract specialized audiences. Additionally, new microprocessor
and software innovations lower creation costs. As production
and distribution costs drop, the price of content may consist
primarily of advertising and fees for artists.
Lessig devotes a great part of his argument to an appeal
for the value of freeness. Although he fears the strangling
effects of commercial interests on the Net's development, he is
"fanatically pro-market." He believes that "if the twentieth
century taught us one lesson, it is the dominance of private
over state ordering [of the allocation of resources]." He calls
Richard Posner, en passant, "perhaps the most ... influential
judge of the last hundred years. ... " (Perhaps he is thinking
that Supreme Court Justices like Brandeis, Harlan and
Warren are not "judges.") Lessig concludes that it is part of the
"character of [our] era" to believe that property rights are "what
makes prosperity work."
Yet, Lessig repudiates this line of pro-market thinking,
and raises a "question" about "whether control [the
privatization or ownership of aspects of the Net] is best."'
IDEAS, supra note 4, at 268.
' Id. at 12.
31 Id. at 202.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 15.
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Seeking the solid ground of wealth-based argument, Lessig
says, "free resources . . . sometimes create more wealth and
opportunity . . . than . . . [if the same resources are] held
privately."' Lessig has no "proof' of this point,' but he offers
four assertions and a vision. First, fairness requires that all be
able to share in the Net.' Second, efficiency, meaning the
optimization of wealth creation, will be best achieved by our
shared, free use of the "innovation commons."' Third,
businesses with market power over any or all of the three
layers of the Net (access, code and content) naturally will be
antagonistic to innovation, because leading firms are not
innovators. Lessig acknowledges his debt to Clay Christensen's
The Innovators Dilemma and says, "[we as a society should
favor the disrupters."' Fourth, some leading firms may close,
instead of open, the Net and extract rents for ownership of
bottlenecks, because they are "malevolent."
As the Progressives would put it, bigness may be bad. In
today's language of management theory, Lessig says that if we
do not "favor the disrupters,"'' we might lose the benefits of the
technological revolution that has "produced the most powerful
and diverse spur to innovation of any in modern times."' He
sees the freeness of the Internet as the wellspring of
innovation.
However, on the first, or access, layer of the Internet,
cable and telephone lines are not cost free for the provider.
Lessig grants that providers incur a cost for these "resources,"
so users have to pay something.' But, he says, "access" over
them should be regulated "neutrally,"" meaning that different
service providers should be able to use the cable pipe or
telephone line. That was the approach of the FTC to the AOLTime Warner merger. Similarly, the 1996 Telecom Act
permitted competitors to lease the dominant telephone network
to compete with the Bells in offering communications services.
34 IDEAS, supra note 4, at 86.
35

Id. at 87.

36

Id.

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 92.
39 IDEAS, supra note
4, at 91.
40 Id. at 92.
41 Id. at 5.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
37
38
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As to this first layer, competition policy produces much the
same outcome as Lessig's approach.
As to the second, or software protocol, layer of the
Internet, Lessig worries that cable companies may not use the
common, free, software of the Internet if and when they get a
firm hold on the consumer market.' Nor does he trust the
intentions of AOL, which intends to use the Time-Warner cable
system, as well as the telephone company networks, to access
consumers.' If only a monopoly offered Net access, then
consumers might value Net content so highly that they would
submit to the provider's limits on web browsing, or its decision
to prioritize its own content, or even to alter the code that
makes the Internet work. Therefore, government should order
that "no major player in the Internet space is able to architect
[employ software code] to empower its own strategic

behavior."'
However, no agency of the current Administration
would seek, or be able to implement, this remedy. Nor does it

seem likely that courts could resolve quickly or fairly litigation
over such a standard for liability. By contrast, as long as
consumers can choose among competitive access providers, we
might reasonably hope that consumers would demand open
and low cost methods of accessing the Net. The best and most
practical antidote to the risks posed by a monopoly over access
is a competitive access market, not a government agency that
would supervise software writing.
As an alternative form of competitive access, Lessig
rightly suggests that the government could and should grant
free (or so-called unlicensed) spectrum so that personal
computer makers can design laptops that find a wireless
connection to the Net through a new technology called wi-fi, or,
even less euphoniously, "802.11."' 7 In brief, your laptop will get
on the Net when you are in Starbucks, or an office building or
an airport, i.e., anywhere that the building owner puts up a
small box giving you a connection that speaks over the air to
your laptop. This would presumably cost the laptop owner little
or nothing per minute. So this wireless access to the Net would
appear to be free.

45
4

47

IDEAS, supra note 4, at 156.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 242.
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The right goal is not to mandate free access to the Net,
but to promote low cost, innovative, competitive access. To this
end, the FCC should put into the private sector enough
airwaves, or spectrum, so as to lower the cost of acquiring the
spectrum close to zero. Lessig correctly makes much of the
importance of the FCC's grant of more unlicensed or free
spectrum. But the cost of using unlicensed spectrum is not
zero. Equipment manufacturers would be obliged to design
devices that negotiated with each other to avoid interfering
with each by sending conflicting radio signals over unlicensed
airwaves. These devices have costs. Nevertheless, to promote
innovation, the FCC should make spectrum available to the
private sector on both a licensed and unlicensed basis, through
both auctions and an allocation of free airwaves for all users.
So much should be turned over to private use that any wireless
innovator could obtain low cost access to spectrum to
experiment with a new business model or technology.
As to the third, or content, layer of the Internet, Lessig
asserts that patents and copyrights should be limited in terms
of years and scope.' Compulsory licenses should be mandated
for file sharing.' Current legislative proposals generally move
in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to a key case here, and Lessig may prevail.' But
again, the highest and best way to unleash the power of
creativity is to insist upon robustly competitive markets in
content generation. In this respect, the government needs to
set limits on consolidation in the content-creation business. As
long as the world of Internet content is competitive, we can be
optimistic that creativity will be as expansive as imagination
permits.
The central political idea of the American government
in the 1990s about the Internet was this: spending and
regulation should be employed to make the Net widespread and
cheap. The "information highway," as the concept of distance
communication was called before we recognized it was the
Internet, was supposed to connect everyone in the world to
everyone else. It would thereby permit an exchange of
information that would stimulate global economic development
and the spread of democracy.
4

Id. at 258, 261.

49 IDEAS, supra note 4, at 255.
50 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted
122 S.Ct.

1062 (Feb. 19, 2002), amended by 122 S.Ct. 1170 (Feb. 25, 2002) (No. 01-618).
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Given the lack of federal spending in the era of balanced
budgets and the willingness of the private sector to invest (on
the bet of deregulation of the information economy), in the
1990s private investment could achieve this vision. Moreover,
there already was at hand an existing network that could be
used for the Net. This was the largest machine ever built: the
world-wrapping telephone system. To promote rapid expansion
of the Net over the telephone network, the FCC classified
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") as business users who had
the right to purchase telephone service at reasonable, flat rate
prices. Therefore, AOL and the 5,000 other ISPs that sprung
into existence in that golden boom decade could pay a fixed fee
per month for use of the network. Yet, the service they built on
the phone company platform competed with telephone company
ISPs and, in the long run, would disrupt the telephone
monopolies.
At the same time, the consumer could use the telephone
line, also purchased for a flat fee, as a connection to the
Internet. As a result, the Internet became an all-you-can-eat
affair, and usage boomed. The American government policies
helped lower prices for Internet access to a price that, in the
early years of the Net, was as low as a tenth of the access
prices in Europe and a hundredth of the access prices in Asia.
It was so cheap that penetration soared in America far faster
than on other continents. And as the Internet became a mass
market, its users became a political constituency prepared to
resist attempts by commercial interests to charge high prices
for what consumers have gotten used to getting for low cost.
Lessig praises these regulations but says they had an
"unintended [positive] effect on the Internet and its growth."'
He asserts: "The regulators ... did not have in their head the
idea that this might create a kind of competition with
telephone service."' He further says, "[tihey did not imagine
the birth of the Internet as a product of their accidental
regulation. " '
But this "idea" was in our head at the FCC in the
1990s.' Andy Grove, then CEO of Intel, cemented it there.
Being a midwife to the Internet, both in classrooms and in
IDEAS, supra note 4, at 149.
2Id.
63

Id.

4REED

E. HUNDT,YOU SAYYOU WANT A REVOLUTION 57 (2000).
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commerce, was a government goal in Congress, the White
House and the FCC. The policy assumed that widespread and
cheap Net access would promote open content. A robustly
competitive and low cost access business was expected to
produce open and free code for communicating among the
Internet access companies. This happened; the Internet
protocols became the lingua franca for access providers. As long
as no one or two firms dominates access, it is less likely that
anyone will have the market power to alter these protocols. We
already see that in file sharing, or music swapping, firms like
Real Networks and Morpheus have been compelled to offer
open software.
The governmental assumption was that, if access was
widespread and cheap, the broad new audience of users would
attract a rapidly multiplying number of Internet content
providers. The ability of users to come together from all over
the country and the world has encouraged providers to
generate niche content that would be unappealing to a
traditional mass media audience. So a progressive magazine
called commondreams.org has materialized on the Net,
whereas it would not be able to attract a print-on-paper
audience due to distribution and marketing costs. A broad base
of e-consumers has stimulated slashdot.com to change
consumer reporting. Day traders catalyzed the creation of
thestreet.com and motleyfool.com, which in turn have
contributed to stability in individual investor confidence that
has mitigated the severity of the recession. Despite Hollywood's
initiatives against file sharing (also known as music
"downloading"), never in history has so much new content been
created so quickly. As a billion people join the world of Net
users in this decade, no end is in sight for content creation.
Consistent with the policy of making the Internet the
new mass medium, government should, over time, phase out
subsidies of voice telephony and instead provide the funds
necessary to make Internet access a universal service. For
example, under the e-rate or Snowe-Rockefeller Amendment,
which was part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC
issued rules that extended the Net into every classroom in
every school in the United States.' The program for Internet in
classrooms costs consumers about $2 billion a year, and has
raised classroom access from 6% in 1996 to about 84% today. It
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2)(A) (2001).
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built a constituency for openness: children. Most important, the
FCC rejected the familiar model of ordering service providers
to connect classrooms. Instead of regulating the monopoly
firm's conduct, the e-rate funded the buyers (school districts)
and let them choose among competitors for networking
solutions. The school districts even had to match the federal
contribution on a 40% to 60% basis. More than nine out of
every ten school districts participated, suggesting the value of
stimulating buy-side initiatives in subsidy programs.
The constituency for a low-priced, if not necessarily free,
Net showed its political muscle against the forces of reaction in
a crucial battle in 1997. In that year, the telephone companies
pushed the FCC to impose the same sort of per-minute charge
local phone companies place on every long distance call, then
roughly five cents a minute. For half an hour of Internet access
per day, that charge would have raised an AOL subscription
from about $20 a month to about $65 a month. At that price not
more than about 20% of Americans would be on the Net now.
That figure is about the same as the European audience in the
late 1990s, who suffered roughly the same pricing as the Bell
companies implicitly proposed here. With low penetration, the
political power of the Internet would be reduced, and
correspondingly the counter-revolutionaries' hand would now
be strengthened.
In response to the telephone companies, AOL
engineered what may have been the first e-mail lobbying
campaign in history. It organized about 200,000 emails to
Congress in support of the FCC's rule against per-minute
charges by local telephone companies on Internet traffic. With
Congress kept at bay by this e-blitz, the FCC proceeded, in
effect, to permit ISPs to enjoy a very low base of input costs as
they borrowed the telephone company network and competed
with each other at the retail level. Now e-lobbying often shows
a happy ability to organize grass roots constituencies. For
instance, U2 lead singer Bono stimulated about 20,000 e-mail
messages from his fans to the Treasury Department in support
of his successful effort to encourage more Administration
funding for the fight against AIDS in Africa.' Voters, after all,
are law.

Joseph Kahn, A Star Close to the Heart of Aid Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2002, at As.
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Presumably voters should espouse the various measures
urged by Lessig. Yet, putting aside the major exception of
music downloading, most patent and copyright issues are
obscure to consumers. And even the downfall of Napster is
politically noteworthy only in that it appears to have spawned
a generation of scofflaws, not political activists. It seems that
the "freeness" issues have less impact on voters than the price
or availability of choice for communications services. Indeed
most politicians will report that hardly anything affects voters
more than the price of regulated cable TV! A focus on
competition, rather than the price of content or the protocols of
software, perhaps would best attract the support of voters.
A century ago Teddy Roosevelt criticized those
Progressives (Brandeis, Wilson) who believed that the ideal
vision of American enterprise was the small businessman
tackling big problems in robustly competitive markets. 7
Instead, he urged the embrace of big business suitable in scale
and scope for a big country, but checked by big government.
That latter vision animated at least the aspects of the New
Deal that included the creation of the FCC and other
quintessential big government solutions to big business'
domination of certain sectors of our economy.
The Internet can carry us at least some distance back
toward the Brandeis-Wilson model. After all, the 1990s did see
the biggest boom of mom-and-pop communications stores ever,
as thousands of new firms were started. The stock market bust
has meant that most investors have not had their dreams of
riches come true, but their creative disruption remains.
However, the current government does not put much emphasis
on regulations that would sustain opportunities for start-ups.
Congress, the White House and the agencies no longer propose
new means by which start-ups can be catalyzed. The era of
digitizing the Library of Congress and placing government on
the Net seems to be last century's story. State and local
regulators charge the rivals of incumbents high prices for using
telephone poles or rights of way, or renting pieces of existing
telephone networks to complete their own networks. Local
building codes and other regulations make it expensive for
start-ups to get connections to offices. The obstacles to building
alternative access methods are many; brushing them away is a
57 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Convention of the
National Progressive Party (Aug. 6, 1912), in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1912, at 8.
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job for the federal government. In the '90s that was the thrust
of FCC policy; in this decade the opposite view prevails. Now
government favors bigness, but coupled with deregulationmeaning the FCC does not seek to regulate big business so as
to create the openness that Lessig seeks.
Nor would any agency in any Administration likely
succeed in the mission Lessig's political science would assign it.
Big businesses generally outgun the big government solution.
That is the long and simple lesson of "agency capture"-the
phenomenon of an administrative agency perpetuating the
interests of the firms under its jurisdiction instead of
promoting creative destruction in the industry for which it is
responsible.
Moreover, the information sector is not just any
industry, but the part of our economy that makes democracy
possible. A regulatory approach to assuring openness-versus
a structural approach-means that government must
constantly monitor the software and the pricing of the
companies that mediate between government and the voters.
The history of broadcast regulation indicates that in such a
relationship, the industry inevitably gains the upper hand over
the lawmakers.
Perhaps the ultimate demonstration of broadcast TV's
dominance over government is the Congressional decision,
embodied in the 1996 Telecom Act, to give TV stations new
spectrum (or airwaves) for high definition television.' Even
today there is essentially no consumer demand for high
definition digital TV over the air. Virtually everyone who wants
digital TV wants it over cable, where it comes not only in sharp
high definition but also with hundreds of channels, instead of
the average three broadcast channels per city. At the time,
William Safire and John McCain said that the spectrum
giveaway was worth $70 billion.59 This was the largest grant of
public property to an industry since the federal government
gave about 10% of the public domain to three dozen railroad
companies in the late nineteenth century to stimulate the
building to the West. That same spectrum is what Lessig now
believes (rightly) should be used for essentially free access to
the Internet. But as long as we embrace regulating the
47 U.S.C. § 336(b)(2) (2001).
Statement of Senator John McCain on the Conference Report
to the
Commerce, State, and Justice Appropriations Bill, October 27, 2000, available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/dccjs0l.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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behavior of those who have market power, instead of regulating
to assure competitive markets, industries like broadcasters will
have the persuasive power to cause regulations to be written
that close, not open the Net.
There are three key steps that the government must
take to secure the future of the Net. First, the FCC should flood
the market with cheap or even free spectrum. It should also
adopt and enforce more pro-competitive regulations to open up
telephone networks that were closed in significant part because
of network effects and economies of scale. In addition, the FCC
should deregulate over time virtually all retail price regulation,
to promote efficient competition. In a competitive market, it is
highly likely that all will adopt the lingua franca of open code.
Competition is a good method of assuring open code;
proprietary codes are more likely to survive in non-competitive
markets.
Second, the United States should insist on the
globalization of the competitive paradigm for building the Net.
That was the purpose of the World Trade Organization
Telecom Treaty of 1997.' However, pivotal questions remain.
Will the existing Administration seek to enforce this treaty? Or
will such issues as steel subsidies drive us away from that
forum? Will the government pursue through treaty, law and
regulation the goal of a truly competitive global information
sector? Will other nations respect our views in light of the
calamities in our corporate governance?
Third, government should set comprehensive, inclusive
social goals for the Internet. For example, broadband should be
universally affordable. Health care, education and politics
(especially voting) should be delivered fairly and efficiently
over the Net. On a global level, the Net can be a tool in
promoting democracy, stimulating economic development in
poor countries and attacking the ignorance and hatred that
may spawn terrorism. To pursue these social goals, competition
among providers seeking reasonable government subsidies is
the ideal approach. The champions of freeness do not normally
address the costs involved in connecting children, the poor and
rural people to the Net. By contrast, believers in pro-active
government focus on developing reasonably efficient subsidies
that stimulate competitors to offer Net access to everyone.

60 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
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The model lawyer of the Progressive movement sought
to "reclaim the power that he himself had abdicated,
refashioning where necessary the instruments of government."6'
The Progressive mentality was to "see that the proper
remediable laws be passed and... existing laws be enforced."'
If we could revive the century-old Progressive spirit, Lessig's
vision would be the future of the Net, and none need despair
the future of ideas freely developed and freely shared. But, for
now the "proper . . . laws" to be "enforced" are the procompetitive statutes and regulations of the 1990s, similar to
the antitrust laws enacted by the Progressives. If antitrust
were law, we might capture technology's benefits of innovation
and the Net could remain forever young.

61 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 202 (1960).
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